Southeast Asian History resources - how to write a term essay/ term paper 2

Southeast Asian History resources - how to write a term essay/ term paper 2

This is the body of the term paper, dealing with the essay topic on Southeast Asian regionalism and history here in English Language Resources Online. Questions to ask yourself about this essay are: what is the style of the term paper like? What is the content of the term paper like? Can I write this paper better? Are there any elements that need refining or better expression for this term paper? Read and study the term paper essay body about Southeast Asia's distinct regional identity and more...


It appears that events within the colonies leading to decolonization negatively impacted the future development of regional identity, because the rise of indigenous nationalism and the concomitant rise of anti-colonialism led to the creation of different independent nation-states that pursued national self-interests and thought in terms of a “national” rather than a “regional” identity. It should be stressed that is possible for a country to have both national and regional identities, but it seems that the rise of indigenous nationalism was initially a “bane” for the formation of regional identity. Amitav Acharya argued that “initially, nationalism undermined the prospects for regionalism”, for instance, Sukarno’s Indonesia, whose “belligerent nationalism threatened his Southeast Asian neighbours and left little scope for … regionalism to flourish” (2000:164). Furthermore, Southeast Asia was nicknamed “the Balkans of Asia”, with “petty nationalisms and jealousies, complete with border disputes and rivalries” (Albert Ravenholt, quoted in Acharya 2000:78). This reinforces the idea that state nationalism was initially a hindrance to the formation of regional identity, as Sukarno’s Konfrontasi (Confrontation) during the 1960s was directed against the formation of Malaysia (2000:82). This nationalistic belligerence can be taken to be ill-boding for the initial formation of regional identity.

Taken superficially, however, one might think that there was only one type of nationalism in the creation of Indonesia. Actually, there were many competing nationalisms, and different forces in the Indonesian “Revolution”, for instance, the rebellion against the Republican forces and the attempt to form the “Darul Islam” (Islamic state) and the communists who took over the Madiun area (Ricklefs 2001:279-281). These complicate the issue. In any case, nationalism was a major force leading to violence and confusion that forced the Dutch to leave Indonesia, but it was also ultimately that same “nationalism” that later hindered the formation of regional identity, because the Republican nationalism engendered thought in terms of Indonesian national interests while competing “nationalisms” created unrest within the country. State nationalism had difficulties maintaining national unity and identity where competing nationalisms caused internal strife. Milton Osborne argued that there was the problem of arriving at an agreed form of government as various groups and minorities had different priorities (2000:185). That which he termed “regional” problems (2000:185) can be named, in this paper, as “localized” problems due to minorities within Southeast Asian nations. According to Osborne, there were factional problems in Indonesia (2000:159). The communists and extremist Islamic sects caused problems during the Revolution that led to “developments in Indonesian politics… that were linked to issues that have continued to preoccupy Indonesian politicians until the present day” (2000:159). I would thus suggest that this internal strife and factional politics hindered the formation of regional identity because the Indonesian government had to settle these internal problems and because the “competing nationalisms” imagined their own version of the state, thus hindering an imagination of the region.

The rise of nationalism was generally accompanied by anti-colonialism. In Indonesia, this could further illuminate why regional identity was hindered. According to Cliff Christie, the main focus for the Indonesian nationalist movement was “unity” (2001:51) Christie argued that Sukarno had to “base Indonesian nationalism on an anti-colonial perspective”, and since Sukarno felt that the reason for the Dutch continued presence in the Dutch East Indies before the Japanese came was due to a lack of unity among Indonesians, he had to remedy this by stressing “unity” (2001:51-54). Theoretically, ideologically speaking, to Sukarno, “the obvious response to imperialism’s ‘divide and rule’ tactic was to insist on national unity above all things”, and hence a mass mobilization of the population (Paget, quoted in Christie 2001:54). Thus the formation of a national identity predicated initially on anti-colonialism in the face of challenges was to be an important part of Sukarno’s Indonesia, whereas regional identity was unimportant. Simply, anti-colonialism was the main focus for nationalism while regionalism had no role.

On the other hand, Amitav Acharya noted that nationalism that resulted in decolonization did not always nor entirely prohibit the formation of regional identity. This means that it was possible, in the long-run, to form a sort of regional identity despite fervent nationalism. It occurred later, when Southeast Asia was well into the Vietnam War, and in the middle of the Cold War, that “Southeast Asian regionalism came into its own” (Acharya 2000:165). According to Acharya, “moderate nationalism” resulted in a regionalist framework that could promote regional identity, and certain leaders “recognized a sufficient congruence between the nationalist and regionalist project” (2000:165). While this serves as a counterweight to the argument that nationalism hindered the formation of regional identity, this alliance between nationalism and regional identity occurred later and in conjunction with the Cold War, a major force in international politics at that time. This confluence of nationalist self-interests and the Cold War situation had a complicated, complex impact on regional identity. Let us deal now with how the Cold War led to decolonization in the case of Indonesia, and then how this affected the formation of regional identity.

The “international theory” postulates that it was changes in the international situation that led to decolonization. It seems that the international situation impacted the formation of a regional identity, due to the Cold War, and specifically, the Vietnam War in the aftermath of French decolonization. The arrival of the Cold War in Asia, on the one hand, led to decolonization in the case of Indonesia, and on the other hand led to a prolonged war in Vietnam before true independence was achieved under communist auspices (Osborne 2000:167). It must be noted that the “international theory” is more complex than just that and this paper focuses on the Cold War in Southeast Asia’s context. In the international situation after WWII there was no place for colonialism as the USA and the USSR wanted to replace imperialism with “their own varieties of influence” (Darwin 1991:6). Simply put, under the international situation after 1945, decolonization speeded up because the world had changed. It can thus be justified that under the “international theory”, the Cold War was the international situation.

The international situation played a large role in the independence of Indonesia. “In the context of the CCP’s approaching triumph, as well as their growing perception of a world-wide threat from Communism”, the USA supported Indonesian independence (Tarling 1998:100). It was the threat of communism reaching Asia and the concomitant threat of communism spreading globally that led to the USA supporting Indonesian independence. According to Nicholas Tarling, it was by a “mixture of struggle and diplomacy – and of some luck” that the Indonesians had won “endorsement” from a superpower and secured their independence (1998:100). This is better understood when we consider the American commitment to the independence of nation-states, and its support for non-communist regimes, in its efforts to contain communism. This view is corroborated by Ricklefs, who argued that Indonesian Republicans, by defeating the communist rebels, “turned vague American sympathy based on anti-colonial sentiments into diplomatic support based on global strategy” (Ricklefs 2001:282). Ricklefs also pointed out that American strategic thinking was dominated by the idea of conflict between the American-led “free world” and the Soviet-led communist bloc – a useful definition of the Cold War – and hence it was important to support Indonesian independence, since Indonesia was anti-communist (2001:282-283). This resulted in pressure from the UN and USA on Holland (2001:283). This impacted regional identity later because Southeast Asia became divided into two ‘blocs’, one anti-communist and the other communist. Acharya suggested that the Cold War “polarized” Southeast Asia (2000:78). Indonesia was anti-communist, but other former colonies like Vietnam were communist; hence I suggest that this “polarization” into two ideologically-opposed areas indeed hindered the formation of regional identity.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed much later in 1967 (Severino 2002:13). Dewi Fortuna Anwar argued that “the establishment of ASEAN in fact divided Southeast Asia into two distinct, but not necessarily, antagonistic subregions” (Anwar 2001:26). It seems fair to say that this division of Southeast Asia into two “subregions” appears to have been a setback for regional identity. Furthermore, while ASEAN aimed for an inclusive Southeast Asia encompassing all Southeast Asian nation-states, “for twenty five years its raison-d’etre was to some extent defined by the existence of the other Southeast Asia” (2001:28). I would refine her words by suggesting that it was not the establishment of ASEAN that divided Southeast Asia; rather, it was a reflection that the region was not one unified, uniform whole. Nonetheless, her ideas are important. The “other Southeast Asia” ostensibly refers to Indochina (and Burma); the key idea is that any regional identity has to decide what is “in” and what is “out” of the imagination. Clearly, communists were not part of ASEAN’s “imagined community”, whereas anti-communists were; Indonesia, for instance.

However, it can be counter-argued that the Cold War actually led to a distinct Southeast Asian identity, however limited. The founding ASEAN states cooperated, “with peace and economic, social and cultural development” the primary goals (Severino 2002:13). That was a form of regional identity because it had a common “imagined community”. The “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation” was signed in 1976, a decade after ASEAN’s formation (2002:17). Clearly, that was the start of a “distinct regional identity”, because the Treaty became the basis for ASEAN membership (2002:17), and also because ASEAN entered the common imagination of Southeast Asian states, although communist Indochina only bought into this imagination later. Indeed, one of the long-term outcomes of the Cold War was to make ASEAN, as a regional organization, part of the Southeast Asian common imagination. Rodolfo Severino, a former Filipino ASEAN Secretary-General, proudly declared:

“A fragmented Southeast Asia does no good … for the prosperity of the world. A united, cohesive and strong ASEAN is a potent force for regional peace and security and for the economic vitality of Asia Pacific and the world.”
(Severino 2002:22)

One could thus possibly argue that the Cold War led, in the long term, to regional identity.